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Law and Oppression: A Moral Call to Abstain from the Use of Moral Language
Benjamin L. Stalnaker
In our increasingly polarized political climate, moral rhetoric is a tool
being deftly wielded to advance controversial positions, target disfavored
groups, and alienate political opponents. Moral language can, and often is,
effective in achieving the goal of the speaker, despite the falsity of the
statements themselves. By moral language or moral rhetoric, it is meant simple
moral language containing generic moral terms and no further justification.
Such terms include good, bad, right, wrong, moral, immoral, just, unjust,
should, ought, etc. Use of these terms is not restricted to those who use them
accurately or even well-intentioned. Examples of that sort of use of moral
language includes Georgia Republican Representative Tom Price’s comments
on the Affordable Care Act, “This bill is an affront on the morality of the
provision of American healthcare […] We lose our morality and our freedom”1
North Carolina Republican Senator David Curtis implicitly invokes moral
language when criticizing Charlotte’s LGBT protection ordinance, “This liberal
group is trying to redefine everything about our society. Gender and marriage
— just the whole liberal agenda. I don’t think we should let national criticism
stop us from doing what we should do.”2 Finally, moral rhetoric is constantly
“AAPS Member Rep. Tom Price, MD’s Floor Remarks on Government Takeover of Health
Care,” last modified on November 7, 2009, http://aapsonline.org/aaps-member-rep-tom-pricemds-floor-remarks-on-government-takeover-of-health-care/.
2 Agrawal, Nadya. “North Carolina Republicans Vow Showdown Over Trans Rights.” The
Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/charlotte-passes-bathroom-bill-toprotect-trans-people-and-conservatives-arent-happy_us_56cdd1e8e4b0928f5a6de60c (accessed
March 3, 2017).
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used to criticize same sex marriage or other issues related to gay rights. These
examples demonstrate that moral norms are often utilized by actors that are
advancing ends antithetical to morality. The misuse of moral language provides
compelling moral reasons for all individuals to abstain from the use of moral
language when discussing laws. While the examples cited above adhere to a
particular set of moral beliefs, the position of this paper still holds regardless of
the content of morality. This piece will begin by demonstrating that the misuse
of moral language is a problem worth addressing. Next, it will answer an
intuitive objection before proving why the position of this paper is an actual
solution to the problem. Finally, a serious objection will be responded to.
The misuse of moral language when discussing laws and policies allows
for the passing of immoral laws and harm to befall vulnerable groups. The use
of moral rhetoric serves a very particular function in the context of law and
politics, namely associating specific public policies with constituents’
preexisting moral commitments.3 Regardless of whether or not the policy
actually aligns with morality, the invocation of the language provides
constituents with additional reasons to approve or disapprove of the policy
depending on the context in which the language is used. Since moral rhetoric
has the potential to garner public support for a law regardless of the
truthfulness of the statements, such language can be used to pass immoral or
amoral laws and policies. Given that immoral laws, especially those passed at
Clifford, Scott, and Jennifer Jerit. “How Words Do the Work of Politics: Moral Foundations
Theory and the Debate over Stem Cell Research.” The Journal of Politics 75.3 (2013): 660.
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the federal level, have the potential to harm millions of people, there is a
compelling reason to attempt to prevent the instrumentalization of moral
language for immoral ends.
An alternative and equally worrisome use of moral language is the impact
it has on specific groups. Specifically, what poses a threat is its ability “to
define the limits of moral communities, to define ingroups versus outgroups.”4
It is common to understandings of morality that different groups warrant
different treatment. Criminals, for example, are not thought to deserve all the
same rights and freedoms as law-abiding individuals. Additionally, there are
also thought to be special moral duties to ones’ friends, family, compatriots,
etc. Since rights and privileges are linked to one’s membership of a morally
relevant group, moral language has the potential to strip away those rights and
deny access to those privileges by categorizing people as outside of the morally
relevant groups.
Loss of membership in moral communities can have severe ramifications.
G. N. Appell makes chillingly clear the consequences of when moral language is
used for that purpose, “By morally devaluing one’s competitor for resources
and power, dehumanization permits guilt-free behavior of any sort that will
obtain one’s goals, even if one’s competitor is destroyed in the process. In fact,
such ethical discourse makes the attack on the competitor morally justifiable.”5

Appell, George N. “Talking Ethics: The Uses of Moral Rhetoric and the Function of Ethical
Principles.” Social Problems 27.3 (1980): 352.
4
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Ibid., 355.
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One need not look far for examples of this sort of use of moral language.
President Trump’s descriptions of Mexican and Muslims both fit into this
category, as does current conservative descriptions of the threat posed by
trans-individuals, and discussion surrounding gay and black individuals. Even
if the particular laws the language is used to support do not pass, the language
itself serves to further alienate marginalized groups and justify future
persecution. This demonstrates that the misuse of moral language is a serious
problem that must be addressed.
Before developing the main arguments for this position, an intuitive
objection will first be addressed. Some might object that it is implausible that
stating accurate moral judgments is wrong. So long as the true statements are
not directly or intentionally harmful, there is nothing wrong about expressing
them. The objection concludes that even if some people are misusing moral
rhetoric, only those guilty parties should be obligated to stop using it. While
seemingly plausible at first glance, this objection is misguided. Paul W. Taylor
provides a useful conceptual framework to understand why the truth of moral
statements is distinct from the morality of uttering those statements. He notes
that the evaluation of moral utterances includes “judging the moral rightness
or wrongness of using certain moral expressions in certain circumstances for
certain purposes.”6 If someone tells an old woman on her death bed that her
son is morally repugnant, they may well be speaking the truth, but that does

Taylor, Paul W. “Moral Rhetoric, Moral Philosophy, and the Science of Morals.” The Journal of
Philosophy 56.17 (1959): 692.
6
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not mean they are acting morally when they tell her this. Examples like that
and countless others lead to the conclusion that, “Whether a given moral
judgment is true or false does not depend on whether it is morally right or
wrong to pronounce it.”7 The objection is therefore shown to be misguided,
because there is no overriding reason why morality cannot require individuals
from abstaining from uttering accurate moral statements.
Since a moral statement being true is insufficient to justify saying it,
some other standard must be used. While initially proposed in the context of
evaluating metaethical theories, Taylor provides a useful metric for how moral
norms on the use of moral language should be evaluated, “Its goal is to become
an instrument which can, if people want to use it, help them to find good
reasons for moral judgments, to use moral language in the clearest and least
misleading ways, and to understand exactly what it is to carry on moral
deliberation or to settle a moral dispute.”8 If it can be demonstrated that
ceasing to use moral language when discussing laws better meets those
aforementioned goals, then it is clear that there are compelling moral reasons
to do so.
The duty to abstain from the use of moral language when discussing
laws is due to how normative force manifests itself in language. In a common
sense understanding of morality, one of its essential features is that it provides

Ibid., 694.
Taylor, Paul W. “The Normative Function of Metaethics.” The Philosophical Review 67.1
(1958): 31.
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normative force that gives individuals reasons to act. The fact that x is moral is
a reason to do x. The fact that y is immoral is a reason to refrain from doing y.
Since morality includes this normative, reason-giving component, statements
containing moral language provide reason to act, rather than merely stating
facts. The statement the affordable care act is immoral, provides people with a
reason to oppose that particular act. This reason is not overriding, if someone
is skeptical of the claim or has an opposing viewpoint, it will not provide a
sufficient reason to act. Even though moral language is capable of conveying
the normative force of morality, that connection is not absolute. Language is
imbued with normative force because of the association with legitimate moral
judgements; it is this association and not the words themselves that provide
the reasons to act.
The association does not need to be perfect; every moral statement need
not be true in order for moral language to continue to convey normative force.
It is important to emphasize, that normative force is only conveyed by moral
judgments that are perceived to be legitimate. If a moral statement is clearly
false, it will not carry reasons to act. However, if moral statements are
plausible, especially if spoken by authority figures, they will often be associated
with legitimate moral judgments. Understanding how normative force is
conveyed through moral language is essential to discovering how the misuse of
moral language occurs and how it can be prevented.

6

The misuse of moral language can be conceived of as a sort of free rider
problem. Moral language functions correctly because the majority of people
using it do so in good faith and only invoke it in connection to accurate moral
judgments. Those who misuse moral language take advantage of this fact. They
invoke moral rhetoric so that their statements, which are empty of moral
content or even antithetical to morality, will be imbued with normative force.
Since the impact of laws are often unclear to the general public and there is a
time delay between discussion of laws and implementation of them, free riders
can take advantage of moral language without undermining faith in it
altogether. However, the only reason why moral language can be misused in
this way is because the free riders are piggybacking off other people’s legitimate
uses of moral language. In the absence of legitimate uses of moral terms, or at
least a refusal by a sizable portion of the population to use moral rhetoric,
invocation of such terms no longer carries the same normative, reason-giving
force.
Flagrant uses of moral rhetoric will become visible for what they are;
namely, an attempt to pass a law irrespective of the accuracy of the moral
statements themselves. While initially said in the context of social sciences,
Appell’s comment is even more applicable to politics and law, “Ethical
discourse has been used as a means of disguising the real motives for social
action by displacing attention from someone’s actual behavior. When ethical
discourse is used to veil a political position, it can weaken the thrust for

7

greater ethical concern.”9 Without legitimate uses of simple moral language,
ethical concern for that sort of language will erode and it will no longer carry
the normative force it once did. Additionally, rather than being broadly
accepted, simple moral language will likely be evaluated critically and with a
good deal of suspicion. This establishes that there is a compelling moral reason
to refrain from using moral language when discussing laws.
Additionally, refraining from using simple moral language when
discussing laws facilitates better moral discourse. A serious issue when
discussing laws with moral ramifications is a refusal to engage substantively
with the other side. One major reason for this is that moral rhetoric often
frames disputes regarding the morality of laws as ultimate moral
disagreements. Taylor notes, “An ultimate moral disagreement occurs when
two people agree on all the facts of the case but disagree in their moral
opinions.”10 While moral disagreements surrounding policies are rarely
ultimate moral disagreements, the language used to discuss them implies
otherwise. By using moral rhetoric, morality is seen to be little more than
surface level intuitions or personal preferences, which means there is no
reason to discuss conceptions of morality further. Moral language therefore has
the tendency to present moral disagreements as irreconcilable. When
individuals cease to use simple moral language, it becomes clear that there are
underlying moral justifications behind positions. There are two substantial

9

Appell, Talking Ethics, 350.
Taylor, The Normative Function of Metaethics, 23.
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benefits associated with this change in moral discourse surrounding laws.
First, it encourages conversation when previously there would only be debate,
which means that individuals are more likely to be convinced to accept the
more accurate position. Additionally, it makes clear that it is as important to
discuss conceptions of morality as it is to discuss possible consequences of
laws. This is essential, because without a clear notion of right or wrong it is
impossible to evaluate laws. Not only does refraining from using simple moral
language when discussing laws prevent misuse of moral language, it also
facilitates better and more clear use overall.
The most significant objection to the position of this paper is that it
prevents moral discourse and disallows criticism of immoral features of laws.
However, it is important to recognize that the principle being defended only
applies to simple moral language. Simple moral language conveys moral
positions without any sort of deeper justification or analysis. An example of
this sort of language is murder is immoral. The same sentiment can be said in
ways that do not fall under the category of simple moral language: murder is
wrong because it denies individuals their right to life or murder is wrong because
it reduces overall wellbeing. This example makes clear that refraining from
using moral language does not mean refraining from expressing moral
sentiments. When used legitimately, simple moral language is merely
shorthand for deeper moral principles and positions. This means that any
individuals who wish to express moral positions about laws are free to do so,
because they can easily fall back upon the underlying moral principles that
9

make their positions true in the first place. Problems only arise for those who
are using moral language to express positions that are devoid of moral content
or reliant upon incorrect moral justifications.
The position defended is particularly effective at solving the problem
identified, because it disallows the instrumentalization of moral language for
amoral or immoral ends. There are three courses of action available to former
moral language free riders. The first option is to stop using moral language
altogether. This is good because it means that moral norms are no longer being
co-opted. Additionally, people “often experience ‘moral outrage’ at the
suggestion that nonmoral considerations be weighed alongside moral ones,”
which means that moral criticism of these laws or policies are likely to be
successful in defeating them.11 The second option available is for former free
riders to continue using simple moral language. However, since that type of
moral language is no longer associated with legitimate moral judgments, it will
cease to have any normative force. Therefore, it would merely be empty rhetoric
that will not provide any reason for people to act. The final option available is
to try to express one’s position in terms of underlying moral principles.
Individuals who had been using empty moral rhetoric all along will not be able
to access this option. The only people able to translate their simple moral
language into deeper moral statements are those whose positions rely on, in
the words of Jonathan Bennet, ‘bad morality.’12 Even in this case, it is better
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for individuals to express their moral sentiments in terms of underlying
principles, rather than merely couching them through simple moral language.
Bad moral positions lose their ability to influence individuals once they
are stated explicitly. There are typically two different ways that these bad moral
positions can be expressed through their underlying justifications. The first
way is a legitimate moral justification that is reliant upon incorrect empirical
facts. An example of this is the position of supporters of anti-trans bathroom
legislation, such as those recently debated in Texas and North Carolina. The
simple moral expression of the defense of these bills it that there is a moral
imperative to implement them. The deeper justification is that these sorts of
bills are needed to safeguard women and children.13 When expressed in this
format, the moral status of these bills becomes an empirical question that can
be easily refuted. The second way these bad moral positions can be expressed
is through false or at times even repugnant justifications. An example of this
sort of justification can be seen during discussion of California’s Proposition 6,
also known as Brigg’s Initiative, which was debated during the late 1970s. The
legislation would have banned all gay and lesbian individuals, and possibly
even supporters of gay rights, from working in California’s public schools. The
underlying justification for this position was that gays and lesbians are moral
deviants who would corrupt children if they had any contact with them.14
When stated in this fashion, moral criticisms can be brought against it and can
Agrawal, North Carolina Republicans Vow Showdown Over Trans Rights.
Grigg, Amanda. “Republicans in North Carolina Strategically Tapped into a Long History of
Anti-LGBTQ Rhetoric.” The Fair Jilt. http://thefairjilt.com/2016/03/24/nctrans/ (accessed
March 3, 2017).
13
14
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clearly demonstrate why it is not a valid moral position. When individuals
refrain from using simple moral language when discussing laws, bad moral
positions can no longer masquerade as something worth influencing policy
decisions.
Given how readily moral language can be instrumentalized for amoral or
immoral ends and its ability to alienate disfavored groups, there are compelling
moral reasons to try to stop or hinder such abuse of moral language. It has
been demonstrated that moral language only has reason-giving force because
of its association with legitimate moral judgments. If individuals refrain from
using simple moral language when discussing laws, the invocation of such
language will no longer exert influence on people. Those who previously
misused moral language are left with three options, but none of the options
allow them to effectively instrumentalize the normative force of morality.
Finally, individuals who wish to express legitimate moral positions are still free
to do so by expressing their underlying moral justifications. This ultimately
facilitates better moral discourse and makes clear the actual moral
ramifications of laws. While the benefits discussed in this paper will not be
immediate, once a norm has been established the situation sketched out above
should develop. Unlike typical collective action problems, nothing is lost by
transitioning from simple moral language to content-laden language, which
means the reasons to refrain from the use of moral language when discussing
laws are overriding.
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